This was seen as a departure from the past, as India had voted with the US and the western bloc against Iran, which was in its extended neighbourhood and with whom it has a historical and civilisational relationship.

This was the time when India had just started negotiating its agreement with the US on its civilian nuclear programme, and Washington was able to lean on Delhi to vote against Tehran. Delhi, which was keen to portray its responsible behaviour as a nuclear power, went along with the idea that voting against Iran’s nuclear programme would burnish its reputation.

However, the resolution did not refer the matter immediately to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and India was one of the countries which urged the western bloc of European countries — UK, France and Germany (EU-3) — to keep the issue at the IAEA.

According to Indian officials, India voted for the resolution at that time, against the majority of NAM members who abstained, because it felt obligated to do so after having pressured the EU-3 to omit reference to immediate referral to the UNSC.

Months later, on February 4, 2006, India again sided with the US when the IAEA Board of Governors voted to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC.

“As a signatory to the NPT, Iran has the legal right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international commitments and obligations… (But) it is incumbent upon Iran to exercise these rights in the context of safeguards that it has voluntarily accepted upon its nuclear programme under the IAEA,” then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Parliament on February 17, 2006.

Over the years, as India negotiated the nuclear deal with the US, Delhi came out of the pressure to vote against Tehran as the issue went to the UNSC. Sources said that once the matter went to the UNSC, India did not have to take any position on Iran’s nuclear programme between 2007 and 2024.

In between, the US administration under President Barack Obama negotiated the JCPOA (joint comprehensive plan of action) with Iran in 2015 — which was a deal between P-5+1 and Iran. US President Donald Trump walked out of the JCPOA in 2017, and Iran’s nuclear programme once again came under scrutiny.

India was forced to stop oil imports from Iran, although its Chabahar port project development was going on. While it did not have to take any firm position against Iran’s nuclear programme, that changed last year when the US brought in a resolution against Iran.

In June 2024, India abstained from a vote at the IAEA regarding Iran. The vote, initiated by the US, aimed to censure Iran for its nuclear programme. While the resolution passed, with 19 out of 35 board members voting to censure Iran, India was among the 16 countries that abstained. This decision reflected India’s balancing act between its deep defence and security relationship with Israel and its historical ties with Iran.

In September 2024, India again abstained from voting on a resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors that censured Iran for its lack of cooperation with the agency’s investigations into its nuclear programme. The resolution, brought by France, the UK, and Germany (E3) along with the US, followed an IAEA report noting Iran’s increased uranium enrichment.

In June this year too, India abstained on the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution strongly criticising Iran’s nuclear programme and declaring it in breach of its 1974 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This time, India’s decision to abstain from the vote reflected its balanced stance — recognising Iran’s right to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy programme while calling upon Tehran to adhere to its non-proliferation commitments.

While the change, from voting against to abstention, marks Delhi’s shifting positions as geopolitical alignments changed, India’s concern about the Iranian nuclear programme was evident.