For the past few weeks, the Gulf energy story has been told mostly through the lens of damage. That is understandable. We have seen attacks on industrial sites, ports and tankers, while the Strait of Hormuz remains the key constraint on exports and recovery. Around a fifth of global oil normally passes through the strait, and the latest attacks have again underlined how exposed regional and global markets remain to disruption in that corridor.

But the more useful question now is not simply what has been hit. It is what still works, what can be rerouted, and how fast operators can adjust.

Impact scale

The current estimate is that the physical impact of this conflict now likely exceeds the energy industry impairments sustained during the 1990-91 Gulf War, including both physical damage and business interruption. This is a serious shock, and it will feed through into global inflation, insurance pricing, financing costs and downstream supply chains.

This is why the story extends beyond oil and gas. Metals, aluminium and petrochemicals are part of the same resilience test. In energy-intensive industries, even a short interruption to power or logistics can create outsized losses. Aluminium is a clear example. Once power is curtailed for too long, the restart problem becomes expensive very quickly.

But that does not mean the Gulf’s energy system has been structurally broken. A great deal of productive capacity, logistics infrastructure and operational capability remains in place. The real question is not whether the region can function at all, but how far operators can adapt, reroute and preserve output while the disruption continues.

The physical impact of this conflict now likely exceeds the energy industry impairments sustained during the 1990-91 Gulf War

What gives me some confidence is that the region is not standing still. Good operators are doing what good operators tend to do under pressure. They are changing production plans, prioritising domestic demand where needed, rerouting logistics and shifting product slates. In petrochemicals, some producers can move from liquid output to solid output, which is easier to truck overland and export through alternative routes. In plain terms, they are trying to keep molecules moving.

Others are bringing planned maintenance forward. If an asset cannot export efficiently today, using this period for a turnaround can preserve future production once routes reopen. That does not remove the loss, but it can turn part of it into a timing effect rather than a permanent one.

Risk management

Insurance is part of that resilience equation, too. Cover is never uniform across the market, because it reflects each operator’s risk appetite. Some businesses are well protected, while others have chosen to retain more risk. In these situations, more proactive risk management actions may be preferred, such as moving inventory, reducing throughput and process operating severity [intensity] to add resiliency to energy infrastructure in case of damage.

Prior investment in resilience is also showing its value more broadly. That includes pipeline networks, flexible logistics, broader product portfolios, experienced operating teams and, in some cases, stronger risk transfer strategies. The businesses under the most pressure are those still heavily reliant on moving bulk liquids through constrained maritime channels and with fewer options when disruption hits. Those with more routes, products and risk flexibility are coping better.

None of this should be mistaken for complacency. Recovery will take time. Even when conditions improve, shipping patterns will not normalise overnight. The losses are real, and the fallout will be global. But this is no longer only a damage story. It is a test of operational resilience, and so far the region is showing it has more of that than many assume.