Contributions to collective defense are often measured by the size of a country’s armed forces, the sophistication of its weapons or the resources it can commit to a conflict. Yet the experience of the Gulf Cooperation Council demonstrates that military power is not determined by these measures alone. Strategic geography, access to critical infrastructure, operational coordination and the willingness to sustain partnerships under pressure can be just as consequential.

As Iran’s attacks reshape the regional security environment, the contribution of the GCC’s smaller members deserves greater recognition. Their experience also offers important lessons for NATO as it considers how best to mobilize the capabilities of its members in an increasingly contested Europe.

Bahrain provides a particularly instructive case study. Since the regional war widened in February, the kingdom has endured repeated Iranian attacks, with the US Congressional Research Service ranking it the fourth-most-targeted country by Iran through August.

Home to approximately 1.6 million people and situated barely 200 km from Iran, Bahrain has faced a disproportionate security burden. Missile and drone strikes have hit an oil refinery, an aluminum smelter and a desalination plant. Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which houses US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet, has also suffered serious damage, with preliminary repair estimates reaching at least $400 million.

Attacks on Bahrain demonstrate the vulnerability of smaller states whose importance far exceeds their size

Zaid M. Belbagi

Such attacks demonstrate the vulnerability of smaller states whose strategic importance far exceeds their physical size. But Bahrain’s response has also demonstrated why they matter to collective defense. Rather than retreating from the partnerships that have made the kingdom a strategic hub, Manama has continued to deepen its security integration with key allies. That decision reflects a fundamental principle: When national security depends on collective arrangements, maintaining those arrangements can be as important as defending territory itself.

Bahrain’s maritime role illustrates this point. US naval activity has been based in the kingdom since 1948 and Bahrain became a major non-NATO Ally in 2002. Today, it hosts the Fifth Fleet, NAVCENT and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, a 47-nation maritime partnership. The UK also maintains its largest external naval base in Bahrain. The kingdom has participated in NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative since 2005 and was the first Gulf state to publicly announce its participation in the US-led International Maritime Security Construct in 2019.

These are not merely diplomatic distinctions. They provide the physical and institutional foundations through which partners coordinate operations, sustain deployments and protect vital shipping routes. When infrastructure supporting multiple allies is damaged, the consequences extend well beyond the host country. Forces must reorganize logistics, identify alternative facilities and maintain operational continuity across thousands of miles. The vulnerability of a small state can therefore become a collective operational problem.

Bahrain’s experience in 2026 has reinforced this reality. On March 5, as Iranian strikes continued to alter the regional security environment, Bahrain, the US and the UK convened extraordinary consultations under the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement. By late September, Bahrain had become the first Gulf partner publicly identified as joining CENTCOM’s Task Force Falcon Strike, a multinational, multidomain initiative built around one-way attack drones and unmanned systems operating in the air, on the surface and underwater. The trajectory is significant: heightened exposure has encouraged deeper integration rather than strategic retrenchment.

This commitment is supported by investment in military capabilities. US foreign military sales notifications for Bahrain in 2026 included $1.62 billion in Patriot missiles, $253 million in precision-guided munitions, $445 million for F-16 sustainment and $950 million for AH-1Z attack helicopters. These investments strengthen Bahrain’s own defenses while supporting interoperability with its partners. Broader economic ties reinforce the relationship. During Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa’s visit to Washington in July 2025, Bahraini and American companies announced about $17 billion in agreements across aviation, technology, industry and investment.

The significance of these commitments lies not simply in their financial value but in their contribution to a wider security architecture. Procurement, industrial cooperation and military integration are mutually reinforcing. A smaller state can contribute to regional stability by acquiring compatible systems, maintaining facilities and ensuring that allied forces can operate together effectively.

For the GCC, the lesson is that collective defense must connect the different strengths of its members

Zaid M. Belbagi

Bahrain’s role also predates the current conflict. When Houthi attacks threatened Red Sea shipping in late 2023, it was the only Arab state publicly named among the initial participants in Operation Prosperity Guardian. Its subsequent support for US-UK strikes against Houthi military targets carried political risks but reflected a recognition that threats to international navigation cannot be contained within national borders. In December 2025, Bahrain and CENTCOM opened a bilateral Combined Command Post for air defense at Ras Al-Bar Camp, providing a dedicated structure for joint planning, coordination and operations.

For a smaller state, hosting such a facility is a force multiplier. Its contribution is no longer measured solely by the number of aircraft, ships or personnel it can deploy. It also lies in enabling partners to plan together, coordinate their capabilities and respond more effectively to emerging threats.

This logic extends to Bahrain’s relations with its GCC neighbors. Manama has consistently described Saudi security as integral to its own and supported Riyadh’s right to defend itself against renewed Houthi threats. It has also publicly stood with Saudi Arabia and Qatar following attacks on their tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Such positions reinforce the principle that threats to one Gulf state can have direct consequences for the security and prosperity of the others.

Bahrain’s willingness to assume politically sensitive regional roles, from joining the Abraham Accords in 2020 to facilitating contacts between Sudan’s warring parties in January 2024, further illustrates its broader diplomatic utility. Small states cannot eliminate regional instability but they can create channels for cooperation and contribute to arrangements that larger powers may struggle to establish alone.

None of this makes Bahrain invulnerable. Its limited strategic depth and proximity to Iran make the costs of alignment unusually visible. The 2026 attacks have demonstrated the risks of hosting critical allied infrastructure. Yet they have also highlighted the operational value of a partner that remains committed under pressure.

For the GCC, the lesson is that collective defense must connect the different strengths of its members. Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess substantial military and economic resources, while smaller neighbors provide strategically located facilities, specialized capabilities and essential diplomatic and operational links. Effective regional defense depends on integrating these contributions rather than measuring them against the same national benchmarks.

NATO should draw a similar conclusion. The contribution of smaller allies cannot be judged solely by defense expenditure or the size of their armed forces. Access to ports and airfields, the hosting of command facilities, maritime coordination and the ability to sustain operations during attacks all shape an alliance’s effectiveness. These functions must be identified, protected and supported through contingency planning, including alternative logistics and arrangements for operating when critical infrastructure is damaged.

Ultimately, collective defense is only as resilient as the network connecting its members. Bahrain’s experience shows that a smaller state can be both a front-line target and an indispensable strategic partner. For the GCC, and for NATO, the task is not simply to ask what each member can contribute independently but how those contributions can be combined to ensure that an attack on one does not undermine the security of all.